How Chicken Little sees the Internet...



Why Chicken Little is a naïve optimist

- Imagine the following species:
 - Poor genetic diversity; heavily inbred
 - Lives in "hot zone"; thriving ecosystem of infectious pathogens
 - Instantaneous transmission of disease
 - Immune response 10-1M times slower
 - Poor hygiene practices
- What would its long-term prognosis be?
- What if diseases were designed...
 - Trivial to create a *new* disease
 - Highly profitable to do so

Threat transformation


Traditional threats

- Attacker manually targets highvalue system/resource
- Defender increases cost to compromise high-value systems
- Biggest threat: insider attacker

• Modern threats

- Attacker uses automation to target all systems at once (can filter later)
- Defender must defend all systems at once
- Biggest threats: software vulnerabilities & naïve users





Large-scale technical enablers

• Unrestricted connectivity

• Large-scale adoption of IP model for networks & apps

• Software homogeneity & user naiveté

- Single bug = mass vulnerability in millions of hosts
- Trusting users ("ok") = mass vulnerability in millions of hosts
- Few meaningful defenses
- Effective anonymity (minimal risk)

Driving Economic Forces


- No longer just for fun, but for profit
 - SPAM forwarding (MyDoom.A backdoor, SoBig), Credit Card theft (Korgo), DDoS extortion, etc...
 - Symbiotic relationship: worms, bots, SPAM, etc
 - Fluid third-party exchange market (millions of hosts for sale)
 - Going rate for SPAM proxying 3 -10 cents/host/week
 - Seems small, but 25k botnet gets you \$40k-130k/yr
 - Generalized search capabilities are next
- "Virtuous" economic cycle
 - The bad guys have large incentive to get better

Today's focus: Outbreaks

- Outbreaks?
 - Acute epidemics of infectious malcode designed to actively spread from host to host over the network
 - E.g. Worms, viruses (for me: pedantic distinctions)
- Why epidemics?
 - Epidemic spreading is the fastest method for largescale network compromise
- Why fast?
 - Slow infections allow much more time for detection, analysis, etc (traditional methods may cope)

A pretty fast outbreak: Slammer (2003)

- First ~1min behaves like classic random scanning worm
 - Doubling time of ~8.5 seconds
 - CodeRed doubled every 40mins
- >1min worm starts to saturate access bandwidth
 - Some hosts issue >20,000 scans per second
 - Self-interfering (no congestion control)
- Peaks at ~3min
 - >55million IP scans/sec




• 90% of Internet scanned in <10mins</p>

 Infected ~100k hosts (conservative)

See: Moore et al, IEEE Security & Privacy, 1(4), 2003 for more details


Was Slammer really fast?

- Yes, it was orders of magnitude faster than CR
- No, it was poorly written and unsophisticated
- Who cares? It is *literally* an academic point
 - The current debate is whether one can get < 500ms
 - Bottom line: way faster than people!




How to think about worms

- Reasonably well described as infectious epidemics
 - Simplest model: Homogeneous random contacts
- Classic SI model
 - N: population size
 - S(t): susceptible hosts at time t
 - I(t): infected hosts at time t
 - ß: contact rate
 - i(t): I(t)/N, s(t): S(t)/N



Predicted # of scans

of scans



What's important?

- There are lots of improvements to the model...
 - Chen et al, *Modeling the Spread of Active Worms*, Infocom 2003 (discrete time)
 - Wang et al, Modeling Timing Parameters for Virus Propagation on the Internet, ACM WORM '04 (delay)
 - Ganesh et al, *The Effect of Network Topology on the Spread of Epidemics*, Infocom 2005 (topology)
- ... but the bottom line is the same. We care about two things:
- How likely is it that a given infection attempt is successful?
 - Target selection (random, biased, hitlist, topological,...)
 - Vulnerability distribution (e.g. density S(0)/N)
- How **frequently** are infections attempted?
 - ß: Contact rate

What can be done?

- Reduce the number of susceptible hosts
 - Prevention, reduce S(t) while I(t) is still small (ideally reduce S(0))

- Reduce the contact rate
 - **Containment**, reduce ß while I(t) is still small

Prevention: Software Quality

- **Goal:** eliminate vulnerability
- Static/dynamic testing (e.g. Cowan, Wagner, Engler, etc)
- Software process, code review, etc.
- Active research community
- Taken seriously in industry
 - Security code review *alone* for Windows Server 2003 ~ \$200M
- Traditional problems: soundness, completeness, usability
- Practical problems: scale and cost

Prevention: Hygiene Enforcement

- **Goal**: keep susceptible hosts off network
- Only let hosts connect to network if they are "well cared for"
 - Recently patched, up-to-date anti-virus, etc...
 - Automated version of what they do by hand at NSF
- Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC)

Containment

Reduce contact rate

Slow down

- Throttle connection rate to slow spread
 - Twycross & Williamson, *Implementing and Testing a Virus Throttle*, USENIX Sec '03
- Important capability, but worm still spreads...

• Quarantine

Detect and block worm

Defense requirements

- We can define reactive defenses in terms of:
 - Reaction time how long to detect, propagate information, and activate response
 - Containment strategy how malicious behavior is identified and stopped
 - Deployment scenario who participates in the system
- Given these, what are the engineering requirements for **any** effective defense?

Defense requirements summary

Reaction time

 Required reaction times are a couple minutes or less for CR-style worms (seconds for worms like Slammer)

Containment strategy

• Content filtering is far more effective than address blacklisting for a given reaction speed


Deployment scenarios

- Need nearly all customer networks to provide containment
- Need at least top 40 ISPs provide containment; top 100 ideal
- Is this possible? Lets see...

Outbreak Detection/Monitoring

- Two classes of detection
 - Scan detection: detect that host is infected by infection attempts
 - **Signature inference**: automatically identify content signature for exploit (sharable)
- Two classes of monitors
 - Ex-situ: "canary in the coal mine"
 - Network Telescopes
 - HoneyNets/Honeypots
 - In-situ: real activity as it happens

Network Telescopes



- Infected host scans for other vulnerable hosts by randomly generating IP addresses
- Network Telescope: monitor large range of unused IP addresses will receive scans from infected host
- Very scalable. UCSD monitors 17M+ addresses

Telescopes + Active Responders

- Problem: Telescopes are passive, can't respond to TCP handshake
 - Is a SYN from a host infected by CodeRed or Welchia? Dunno.
 - What does the worm payload look like? Dunno.
- Solution: proxy responder
 - Stateless: TCP SYNACK (Internet Motion Sensor), per-protocol responders (iSink)
 - Stateful: Honeyd
 - Can differentiate and fingerprint payload
 - False positives generally low since no regular traffic

HoneyNets

- Problem: don't know what worm/virus would do? No code ever executes after all.
- Solution: redirect scans to real "infectable" hosts (honeypots)
 - Individual hosts or VM-based: Collapsar, HoneyStat, Symantec
 - Can reduce false positives/negatives with host-analysis (e.g. TaintCheck, Vigilante, Minos) and behavioral/procedural signatures
- Challenges
 - Scalability
 - Liability (honeywall)
 - Isolation (2000 IP addrs -> 40 physical machines)
 - Detection (VMWare detection code in the wild)

Overall limitations of telescope, honeynet, etc monitoring

- **Depends** on worms scanning it
 - What if they don't scan that range (smart bias)
 - What if they propagate via e-mail, IM?
- Inherent tradeoff between liability exposure and detectability
 - Honeypot detection software exists
- It doesn't necessary reflect what's happening on your network (can't count on it for local protection)
- Hence, we're always interested in native detection as well

Scan Detection

- Idea: detect worm's infection attempts
 - In the small: ZoneAlarm, but how to do in the network?
- Indirect scan detection
 - Wong et al, A Study of Mass-mailing Worms, WORM '04
 - Whyte et al. DNS-based Detection of Scanning Worms in an Enterprise Network, NDSS '05
- Direct scan detection
 - Weaver et al. Very Fast Containment of Scanning Worms, USENIX Sec '04
 - Threshold Random Walk bias source based on connection success rate (Jung et al); use approximate state for fast hardware implementation
 - Can support multi-Gigabit implementation, detect scan within 10 attempts
 - Few false positives: Gnutella (finding accessing), Windows File Sharing (benign scanning)
 - Venkataraman et al, New Streaming Algorithms for Fast Detection of Superspreaders, just recently

Signature inference

- Challenge: need to automatically *learn* a content "signature" for each new worm – potentially in less than a second!
- Singh et al, Automated Worm Fingerprinting, OSDI '04
- Kim et al, Autograph: Toward Automated, Distributed Worm Signature Detection, USENIX Sec '04

Approach

- Monitor network and look for strings common to traffic with worm-like behavior
- Signatures can then be used for content filtering

PACKET HEADER SRC: 11.12.13.14.3920 DST: 132.239.13.24.5000 PROT: TCP																					
PACKET PAYLOAD (CONTENT)																					
00F0	90	90	90				- D											••••			••
0100	90	90	9		KIK	<mark>) V l</mark>	1.R	SI	gn	ati	re	Ca	apt	ur	ed	by	/			M?	. W
0110	90	90	9		F	arly	vhi	rd	or	ר N/	1av	/ 1	<mark>4</mark> th	2	00	4		. cd			••
0120	90	90	90	עפ	-90-		yDI	I G		30	<u>, a</u>	30	30	, 	50	30	••••	••••			• •
0130	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	EB	10	5A	4A	33	C9	66	B9	• • • •		2	ZJ3.	f.
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
Content sifting

- Assume there exists some (relatively) unique invariant bitstring *W* across all instances of a particular worm (*true today, not tomorrow...*)
- Two consequences
 - **Content Prevalence**: *W* will be more common in traffic than other bitstrings of the same length
 - Address Dispersion: the set of packets containing W will address a disproportionate number of distinct sources and destinations
- Content sifting: find W's with high content prevalence and high address dispersion and drop that traffic


The basic algorithm



Detector in network











Prevalence Table





Address **Dispersion** Table

0001000	Destinations









Challenges

Computation

- To support a 1Gbps line rate we have 12us to process each packet
 - Dominated by memory references; state expensive
- Content sifting requires looking at every byte in a packet

State

 On a fully-loaded 1Gbps link a naïve implementation can easily consume 100MB/sec for tables

Kim et al's solution: Autograph

- Pre-filter flows for those that exhibit scanning behavior (i.e. low TCP connection ratio)
 - HUGE reduction in input, fewer prevalent substrings
 - Don't need to track dispersion at all
 - Fewer possibilities of false positives
- However, only works with TCP scanning worms
 - Not UDP (Slammer), e-mail viruses (MyDoom), IMbased worms (Bizex), P2P (Benjamin)
- Alternatives? More efficient algorithms.

Which substrings to index?

- Approach 1: Index all substrings
 - Way too many substrings → too much computation → too much state
- Approach 2: Index whole packet
 - Very fast but trivially evadable (e.g., Witty, Email Viruses)
- Approach 3: Index all contiguous substrings of a fixed length 'S'
 - Can capture all signatures of length 'S' and larger



How to represent substrings?

- Store hash instead of literal to reduce state
- Incremental hash to reduce computation
- Rabin fingerprint is one such efficient incremental hash function [Rabin81,Manber94]
 - One multiplication, addition and mask per byte
- P1 R A N D A B C D O M Fingerprint = 11000000
 P2 R A B C D A N D O M Fingerprint = 11000000

How to subsample?

Approach 1: sample packets

• If we chose 1 in N, detection will be slowed by N

• Approach 2: sample at particular byte offsets

- Susceptible to simple evasion attacks
- No guarantee that we will sample same sub-string in every packet
- Approach 3: sample based on the hash of the substring

Value sampling [Manber '94]

- Sample hash if last 'N' bits of the hash are equal to the value 'V'
 - The number of bits 'N' can be dynamically set
 - The value 'V' can be randomized for resiliency



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SAMPLE

- P_{track} → Probability of selecting at least one substring of length S in a L byte invariant
 - For 1/64 sampling (last 6 bits equal to 0), and 40 byte substrings
 P_{track} = 99.64% for a 400 byte invariant

Content sifting summary

- Index fixed-length substrings using incremental hashes
- Subsample hashes as function of hash value
- Multi-stage filters to filter out uncommon strings
- Scalable bitmaps to tell if number of distinct addresses per hash crosses threshold
- Now its fast enough to implement

Sasser


early bird Intrusion Detection System

Monday 03rd of May 2004 12:21:10 PM


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Last Report			04-05-03 12:20:47															
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Destinations		632		[list destinations]														
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		45		5c		00		00		05	00	00	03	10	00	00	00	E.\
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		ec	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	ec	03	00	00	90	90	90	90	
		90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90		90	
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		90	90	90	90	90	90	90		90	90	90	90	eb	10	5a	4a	ZJ
			с9			7d		80	34	0a		e2				e8		3.f.}4
		ff	ff	ff	70	95	98	99	99	c3	fd	38	a9	99	99	99	12	p8

[display entire payload]

Sasser




Number of distinct Sources and Destinations



Kibvu

- Slower spread (1.5 packets/minute inbound)
- Consequently, slower detection (42mins to dispersion of 30)
- Response time is wrong metric...



False Negatives

- Easy to prove presence, impossible to prove absence
- Live evaluation: over 8 months detected every worm outbreak reported on popular security mailing lists
- Offline evaluation: several traffic traces run against both Earlybird and Snort IDS (w/all worm-related signatures)
 - Worms not detected by Snort, but detected by Earlybird
 - The converse never true

False Positives

Common protocol headers

- Mainly HTTP and SMTP headers
- Distributed (P2P) system protocol headers
- Procedural whitelist
 - Small number of popular protocols

Non-worm epidemic Activity

- SPAM
- BitTorrent

GNUTELLA.CONNECT

- /0.6..X-Max-TTL:
- .3..X-Dynamic-Qu
- erying:.0.1..X-V
- ersion:.4.0.4..X
- -Query-Routing:.
- 0.1..User-Agent:
- .LimeWire/4.0.6.
- .Vendor-Message:
- .0.1..X-Ultrapee

r-Query-Routing:

Summary

- Internet-connected hosts are highly vulnerable to worm outbreaks
 - Millions of hosts can be "taken" before anyone realizes
 - If only 10,000 hosts are targeted, no one may notice
- Prevention is a critical element, but there will always be outbreaks
- Containment requires fully automated response (dp
- Scaling issues favor network-based defenses
- Different detection strategies, monitoring approaches
 - Very active research community
- Content sifting: automatically sift bad traffic from good